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FREE SPEECH UNDER FIRE: THE FUTURE OF THE
FIRST AMENDMENT
Nicholas W. Allard*
President, Joseph Crea Dean and Professor of Law
I gave up bragging for lent . . . well I am trying. It’s hard. Put
yourself in my shoes. Imagine coming to work every day with
extraordinary people at our great law school, such as Professor Joel
Gora and distinguished visiting Professor of Law, Judge Andrew
Napolitano. Many months ago, Joel and Andrew conceived and,
since then, assembled and worried to perfection today’s incredible
program about the state of free speech in America and the future of
the First Amendment.1
The thunderous and often sharply divisive crescendo of public
discourse over beliefs, values, and rights currently reverberating
through communities, campuses, campaigns, and all
communications channels demonstrates the challenge facing the
participants in this symposium. Led by our world-class faculty
including professors Beryl Jones-Woodin, Sabeel Rahman Kahn,
Miriam Baer, Nelson Tebbe, and our incomparable vice dean Bill
Araiza, the learned and wise speakers you will hear from are more
than up to the task––they are, simply put, giants in their fields. Some
I have known and had the privilege of working with in the past,
others I have long admired and I have followed their work with
intense interest for many years.
Today’s program offers us an extraordinary example
demonstrating why it is that what law schools do matters—law
schools are centers for learning how to use the power of law in the
service of people and society at home and abroad. And that is a
*These remarks were given to open the proceedings of the esteemed scholarship
presented as part of Brooklyn Law School’s Symposium, Free Speech Under
Fire: The Future of the First Amendment on February 26, 2016.
1
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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worthy mission. It is why I deeply believe that, notwithstanding the
critics and persistent pessimism about the state of legal education,
and despite the hypnotic obsessive fixation pseudo-scientific
rankings have in many quarters to the exclusion of almost anything
else about law schools and the profession, we all can be justifiably
proud of what we do to prepare new lawyers for the noble
profession.
In this vein, it is appropriate to ask each of you to reflect for just
a moment upon what prompted you to become a lawyer, and
especially I ask our many students present, think about why you
entered law school.
This is on my mind because last week’s news of Harper Lee’s
death transported me back, in a Proustian flash of childhood
memory, to a summer night long ago. I remember looking up at the
big movie screen at the Route 110 drive-in in Melville, New York,
and sitting between my parents in my pajamas in the front seat, with
my siblings asleep in the back, when I heard the unforgettable
words: “Jean Louise, stand up, your father is passing.” For me, and
for many others, Reverend Sykes’ gentle admonishment to Scout in
To Kill a Mockingbird,2 that she should show respect to her father
who had just defended a black man wrongly accused of rape,
provided a spark that ignited a lifelong passion for law. Of course,
we have moved on from a time when the story of social and racial
justice was told in stylized terms of a noble white savior of helpless
blacks. Even my fictional Atticus Finch has evolved, and to put it
mildly, is now portrayed in the sequel as more complex.3 But the
point is—and it is poignantly apt as we approach the end of black
history month which our students, faculty, and especially our Black
Law Students Association have so effectively observed—the point
is that each of us had inspirations and worthy purposes leading us to
legal careers, whether the motivation came from real-life legal
heroes like Thurgood Marshall or Nelson Mandela; suffragette
lawyers, such as Rosalie Gardner Jones, Brooklyn Law School class
2

HARPER LEE, TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (1960).
In the sequel, or what many regard as a first draft of To Kill A Mockingbird,
the adult Jean Louise returns to her fictional childhood home in Alabama. It is a
story of disillusionment with the racism she discovers in the community,
including her once revered father, Atticus. See HARPER LEE, GO SET A
WATCHMAN (2015).
3
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of 1906, a courageous Brooklyn lawyer Jim Donovan, portrayed by
Tom Hanks in the movie Bridge of Spies; our parents and other
family members; or fictional heroes like my Atticus Finch or Perry
Mason, who Justice Sotomayor wrote in her autobiography inspired
her.4 Justice Sotomayor will be here in April to meet with our
students, and they may ask her about her heroes.
But today we wrestle with the paradox of freedom. Freedom is
not truly achievable by any single person on their own, and
counterintuitively, in order to enjoy the fruits and blessings of
freedom, self-restraint and tolerance are necessary. Even the ancient
hermit, the lonely castaway on an uncharted island, or the isolated
mountain man of our western lore were not truly free because they
were prisoners of their onerous daily routine that they needed to
survive on their own. By communing with the society of others the
possibilities for life and for freedom proliferate.
Yet, being fully engaged with others demands self-control,
patience, restraint, and tolerance because we are each in the end very
different. Without such discipline, chaos ensues and all freedom can
be lost—especially when confusion, fear, and dysfunction open the
door for government-imposed order and ultimately tyranny.
Which brings us to the subject of freedom of speech. Speech,
and indeed all communication, is meaningless, indeed impossible,
without involving other people. For free speech to thrive there must
be restraint and tolerance. It is a question of balance. And where that
line should be, and how it is adjudged and enforced is what I expect
we will consider thoroughly through this promising day-long
symposium.
It is my hope that our work today will be the start of more formal
ongoing efforts for us to have some continuing leadership in this
field of critical importance to our democratic republic.

4

SONIA SOTOMAYOR, MY BELOVED WORLD 80–81 (2013).

FREE SPEECH UNDER FIRE: THE FUTURE OF THE
FIRST AMENDMENT
KEYNOTE REMARKS BY FLOYD ABRAMS
MODERATOR, PROFESSOR JOEL GORA
I can think of no better way to be in serious consideration of the
future of the First Amendment1 than to hear keynote remarks from
perhaps the country’s most well-known and highly-regarded First
Amendment lawyer, Floyd Abrams, a long-time partner at Cahill
Gordon & Reindel, the author of numerous books and articles about
the First Amendment, counsel in many of the most important First
Amendment landmark cases of the past forty-five years—from the
Pentagon Papers case in 19712 to the Citizens United decision3 in
our time—and a professor of First Amendment and media law at
Yale and Columbia law schools.
Few people have thought about the meaning and purpose of the
First Amendment as carefully as he has and few people have helped
implement the guarantees of the First Amendment as effectively as
he has. It is also my great fortune to have worked with him on many
of those cases and issues over the years. Ladies and gentlemen, Mr.
Floyd Abrams.

1

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); David W.
Dunlap, Supreme Court Allows Publication of Pentagon Papers, N.Y. TIMES
(June 30, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/30/insider/1971-supremecourt-allows-publication-of-pentagon-papers.html.
3
See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Floyd
Abrams, Citizens United and Its Critics, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 77 (2010),
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/citizens-united-and-its-critics.
2
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FLOYD ABRAMS
Good morning everyone. You all are honored by Joel’s presence
today and the work that he has done and contributions he has made
as a teacher, scholar, and advocate. He is a First Amendment giant.
I am especially glad to be here in light of the extraordinary
assemblage of First Amendment scholars and practitioners. One
might even say, to coin a phrase, that this may well be the most
extraordinary collection of First Amendment talent and knowledge
that has ever been gathered in one time and place, except, if you
recall the phrase, “when Thomas Jefferson dined alone.”4
We meet, of course, shortly after the death of Justice Scalia and
I thought I’d talk a little bit about him. On a personal level, I knew
him well, but no better than a few drinks together, a few dinners,
and a few letters exchanged might suggest. I do recall talking with
him at Kennedy Airport once when both of us were about to fly to
California to participate in some sort of panel. He checked in. I
checked in after him. I was told my reservation had been cancelled.
There was no seat. I said, “It can’t have been cancelled. I didn’t
cancel it. I have a seat. I have to go. I have to be there,” and I went
on and on. They finally let me stay on the plane. Justice Scalia came
up behind me and said, “You want to change your position on capital
punishment?”
Some years later, Nadine Strossen, who will be participating a
little later today in one of your panels, and I were in London at the
same time and she invited me to join her and Justice Scalia for a few
drinks after he had appeared before a panel there in which he told
the mostly English participants that there really was no such thing
as international law and certainly no such thing that America had to
follow; something he very much enjoyed saying and that his
audience very much hated to hear.
We started talking about First Amendment cases, in particular a
case called Hill v. Colorado, a 1990 case at the Supreme Court
which had affirmed, over Justice Scalia’s dissent, significant

4

President John F. Kennedy, Remarks at a Dinner Honoring Nobel Prize
Winners of the Western Hemisphere (Apr. 29, 1962), in PUB. PAPERS
PRESIDENTS, Apr. 1962, at 347, 347.
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limitations on speech in areas around abortion clinics.5 All three of
us—Nadine, myself, and Justice Scalia—agreed how terrible Justice
Stevens’ majority opinion was and how terrific Justice Scalia’s
dissenting opinion had been. He enjoyed the conversation. He sat
with a cigar in one hand, a drink in the other and he said, “You know,
I’m really not so bad about the First Amendment.” And he wasn’t. I
didn’t agree with most of his views on other topics and some of his
views on the First Amendment, but that is not exactly a standard that
binds anyone else.
I’ll tell you this. When Justice Scalia was on your side in an
argument you were making, or an opinion he wrote, you would be
forever grateful. Often, even in areas of law that you thought you
knew well, and certainly in areas that you knew you did not, he had
much to teach you.
I want to cite one example which hardly involved the most
momentous moment of his career, but which had a good deal to do
with the changing of my own views in a significant area. The case
was the Court’s 1990 ruling in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce, in which a six-person majority of the Court joined an
opinion of Justice Marshall sustaining the constitutionality of a
Michigan law which barred corporations from using its corporate
treasury funds for independent expenditures in support of candidates
or in opposition to candidates.6 Justice Scalia’s dissent in that case,
from its first extraordinary words to the last, seemed to me then and
now a thing of beauty, passionate and persuasive.
I thought I’d read to you a few paragraphs from it. The opinion
began with three words that make the opinion stand out in the history
of the Court: “Attention all citizens.”7 He then followed with this:
“To assure the fairness of elections by preventing disproportionate
expression of the views of any single powerful group, your
Government has decided that the following associations of persons
shall be prohibited from speaking or writing in support of any
candidate.”8 Then, there was a blank that he left for you to fill in the

5
6
7
8

Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
Id. at 679 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id.
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names of the entities which would no longer be able to speak about
this subject.9
He then went on to say this:
In permitting Michigan to make private corporations
the first object of this Orwellian announcement, the
Court today endorses the principle that too much
speech is an evil that the democratic majority can
proscribe. I dissent because that principle is contrary
to our case law and incompatible with the absolutely
central truth of the First Amendment: that
government cannot be trusted to assure, through
censorship, the “fairness” of political debate.10
A later paragraph read this way:
The Court does not try to defend the proposition that
independent advocacy poses a substantial risk of
political “corruption,” as English speakers
understand that term. Rather, it asserts that that
concept (which it defines as “‘financial quid pro quo’
corruption”) is really just a narrow subspecies of a
hitherto unrecognized genus of political corruption.
“Michigan’s regulation,”—quoting from Justice
Marshall’s opinion—“aims at a different type of
corruption in the political arena: the corrosive and
distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth
that are accumulated with the help of the corporate
form and that have little or no correlation to the
public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.”11
Continuing with Justice Scalia:
Under this mode of analysis, virtually anything the
Court deems politically undesirable can be turned
into political corruption—by simply describing its
effects as politically “corrosive,” which is close
enough to “corruptive” to qualify. It is sad to think

9

Id.
Id. at 679–80.
11
Id. at 684.
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that the First Amendment will ultimately be brought
down not by brute force but by poetic metaphor.12
The opinion concluded with this:
The premise of our system is that there is no such
thing as too much speech—that the people are not
foolish but intelligent, and will separate the wheat
from the chaff. As conceded in Lincoln’s aphorism
about fooling “all of the people some of the time,”
that premise will not invariably accord with reality;
but it will assuredly do so much more frequently than
the premise the Court today embraces: that a healthy
democratic system can survive the legislative power
to prescribe how much political speech is too much,
who may speak and who may not. Because today’s
decision is inconsistent with unrepudiated legal
judgments of our Court, but even more because it is
incompatible with the unrepealable political wisdom
of our First Amendment, I dissent.13
I think that it’s about as good as it gets in terms of judicial
rhetoric and more importantly, in encapsulating the First
Amendment. In fact, it’s such a pleasure to read, I’ll read a little bit
more from a much more recent case, Brown v. EMA, a case
involving California limitations on juveniles buying or renting
violent video games.14 Justice Scalia wrote the opinion for the Court
striking down the California statute.15 Justice Alito, in his
concurring opinion, had described at great length the extraordinary
excesses of some of the violent video games available for
purchase.16
Here’s how Justice Scalia dealt with that:
Justice Alito has done considerable independent
research—a very neat way to put Justice Alito down
for doing and relying on his own research—to
identify video games in which “the violence is
12
13
14
15
16

Id.
Id. at 695.
Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011).
See id. at 805.
See id. at 818 (Alito, J., concurring).
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astounding.” “Victims are dismembered, decapitated,
disemboweled, set on fire, and chopped into little
pieces . . . . Blood gushes, splatters and pools.”
Justice Alito recounts all these disgusting video
games in order to disgust us—but disgust is not a
valid basis for restricting expression. And the same
is true of Justice Alito’s description of those video
games he has discovered that have a racial or ethnic
motive for their violence—“‘ethnic cleansing’
[of] . . . African-Americans, Latinos, or Jews.” To
what end does he relate this? Does it somehow
increase the “aggressiveness” that California wishes
to suppress? Who knows? But it does arouse the
reader’s ire, and the reader’s desire to put an end to
this horrible message. Thus, ironically, Justice
Alito’s argument highlights the precise danger posed
by the California Act: that the ideas expressed by
speech—whether it be violence, or gore, or racism—
and not of objective effects, may be the real reason
for governmental proscription.17
I’ll put aside the beauty of that writing, the lawyer skill reflected,
the advocate’s power revealed. Just think how powerful it is to deal
with the horror show set forth in Justice Alito’s opinion by pointing
out persuasively that what it amounts to is concern about the ideas
that stem from video games’ awful excesses. We will miss someone
who can write and think like this and who could defend the First
Amendment so effectively.
In Justice Scalia’s honor, I thought I’d engage in a little bit of
my own originalism for you today about the Bill of Rights,18 in
general, and the First Amendment, in particular, which bear, I think,
on the various topics that will be considered today. I begin with two
decisions made at the time of the drafting of the Constitution itself
in Philadelphia in 1787.
The first was one of tone, and the writers of the Constitution—
Madison and his colleagues—understood full well the difference
between writing a Declaration of Independence and a Constitution
17
18

Id. at 798–99 (citations omitted).
U.S. CONST. amends. I–X.
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that would succeed the Articles of Confederation that had created an
alliance of entities freed from British rule, but did not really function
as a national government.
In drafting the Constitution, the founders made no effort to
match the grace or passion of Jefferson’s glowing revolutionary
rhetoric in the Declaration of Independence of the previous decade.
No inalienable rights were referred to in the new document, no pans
to human rights offered. The Constitution’s language, as Clinton
Rossiter has observed, was “[p]lain to the point of severity, frugal to
the point of austerity, laconic to the point of aphorism.”19 It was, in
short, not a poem, but a blueprint; one devoted to establishing a new
government and setting forth how it would work, and it had been
agreed upon after what John Adams described as “the greatest single
effort of national deliberation that the world has ever seen.”20
Madison’s understandable satisfaction at the result is reflected
in a letter he wrote to Jefferson, his friend, mentor, and then U.S.
ambassador to France, which observed that it is “impossible to
consider the degree of concord which ultimately prevailed as less
than a miracle.”21
One of the topics as to which there had been nearly complete
accord was not to include a bill of rights in or with the
Constitution.22 This was the second decision to which I referred, and
to say the least, a major one of substance, although discussed by the
framers much less than many other topics, including the power of
the President, how to set up electoral districts, how to deal with
slavery, and a wide range of other topics.
But there was a vote on whether to have a bill of rights or not,
and when the vote was taken ten states voted against it, and none
voted for it. The record of the Constitutional Convention reads this
way: “On the question for a Come to prepare a Bill of Rights N.H.
no. Mas. abst. Ct no. N— J— no. Pa. no. Del— no. Md no. Va no.
N— C. no. S— C— no— Geo— no.”23
19

CLINTON ROSSITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION 258 (1966).
Id. at 11.
21
CARL J. RICHARD, THE FOUNDERS AND THE BIBLE 161 (2016).
22
2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 588 (Max
Farrand ed., 1911).
23
Id.
20
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When two delegates after that vote proposed a declaration
stating, “that the liberty of the Press shall be inviolably observed,”
Roger Sherman from Connecticut responded that since “the power
of Congress does not extend to the [p]ress,” it was unnecessary to
say that the press was protected against the government. The
Convention rejected that motion by a seven-to-four vote.24
What may have seemed obvious enough to the delegates was far
less so to others. Jefferson was personally appalled that the newly
empowered national government would not be explicitly limited in
its authority by specific prescriptions. “It astonishes me,” Jefferson
wrote to William Stephens Smith, “to find . . . our countrymen . . .
should be contented to live under a system which leaves to the
governors the power of taking from them the trial by jury in civil
cases, freedom of religion, freedom of the press” and other rights.25
“[A] bill of rights,” Jefferson wrote to Madison, “is what the people
are entitled to against every government on earth, general or
particular, and what no just government should refuse, or rest on
inference.”26
Another of Jefferson’s letters stated that he had disapproved
from the first moment the want of a bill of rights to guard against
the legislative, as well as the executive branches of the
government.27
So, when the states had to decide whether to adopt the
Constitution, critics of the newly drafted Constitution focused their
fire on the absence of a bill of rights in addressing the issue of
ratification. Patrick Henry, opposing ratification before the Virginia
legislature, said, “A bill of rights may be summed up in a few
words.”28 Why not use them? “[O]therwise,” Henry said, “[t]he
officers of Congress may come upon you now, fortified with all the
terrors of [a] paramount federal authority.”29
24

JEFFERY A. SMITH, WAR & PRESS FREEDOM: THE PROBLEM OF
PREROGATIVE POWER 29 (1999).
25
THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, &
ORIGINS 116 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997) [hereinafter THE COMPLETE BILL OF
RIGHTS].
26
Id. at 659.
27
Id. at 116.
28
Id. at 100.
29
Id.
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In South Carolina, James Lincoln complained that he would, “be
glad to know why, in this Constitution, there is a total silence with
regard to the liberty of the press. Was it forgotten? Impossible! Then
it must have been purposely omitted; and with what design, good or
bad, he left the world to judge. The liberty of the press,” he said,
“was the tyrant’s scourge—it was the true friend and firmest
supporter of civil liberty; therefore why pass it by in silence?”30
In Cincinnatus, one of a number of anonymous critics of the
newly drafted Constitution said that, “not only some power is given
in the constitution to restrain, and even to subject the press, but that
it is a power totally unlimited; and may certainly annihilate the
freedom of the press.”31
Responses from opponents of including a bill of rights offered
views similar to Sherman’s. Why, Alexander Hamilton, not yet a
musical comedy star, responded in much quoted questions he posed
in Federalist Paper #84:
why [should the charter of the newly-reorganized
government] declare that things shall not be done
which there is no power to do? Why for instance
should it be said, that the liberty of the press shall not
be restrained, when no power is given by which
restrictions may be imposed?
In fact, Hamilton argued, “[T]he constitution is itself in every
rational sense, and to every useful purpose, A BILL OF RIGHTS.”32
Similar themes were articulated by other supporters of the new
Constitution. “Where,” as Governor Randolph of Virginia asked, “is
the page [in the Constitution] where [freedom of the press] is
restrained? If there had been any regulation about it, leaving it
insecure, then there might have been reason for clamors. But this is
not the case.” As he said, “I again ask for the particular clause which
gives liberty to destroy the freedom of the press.”33

30

Id. at 98.
Id. at 106.
32
ALEXANDER HAMILTON ET AL., THE FEDERALIST (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961), reprinted in Alexander Hamilton, Federalist, no. 84, 575—81, THE
FOUNDERS CONSTITUTION: BILL OF RIGHTS (May 28, 1788), http://presspubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/bill_of_rightss7.html.
33
THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 25, at 100.
31
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Others mocked the very notion of a bill of rights. Roger Sherman
said, “No bill of rights has ever yet bound the supreme power longer
than the honeymoon of a new married couple.”34 Noah Webster,
tongue deeply in cheek, suggested that if it was a list of inalienable
rights that was necessary, the Constitution should include a clause
saying that, “everybody shall, in good weather, hunt on his own
land, and catch fish in rivers that are public property . . . and that
Congress shall never restrain any inhabitant of America from eating
and drinking, at seasonable times, or prevent his lying on his left
side, in a long winter’s night.”35
Madison had initially opposed the inclusion of a bill of rights,
referring to it as a useless “parchment barrier[ ]”36 which “will never
be regarded when opposed to the decided sense of the public.”37 But
confronted with political threats to his own election to the House of
Representatives, in which his opponent and later successor as
President, James Monroe, supported the inclusion of a bill of rights,
Madison shifted his position from opponent to sponsor. Madison
wrote the first draft of a bill of rights and introduced it in the first
Congress with the tepid assertion that, given public concern about
its absence, its inclusion offered “something to gain and, if we
proceed with caution, nothing to lose.”38
As initially proposed in June, 1789, the equivalent of what
became the First Amendment’s language about freedom of speech
and of the press reads remarkably similar to what we have today—
except in one respect. Madison’s first proposal relating to freedom
of expression submitted to the House was phrased this way: “The
people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right to speak, to
34

Daryl J. Levinson, Rights and Votes, 121 YALE L. J. 1286, 1363 n.20
(2012) (quoting Roger Sherman, A Countryman, II., NEW HAVEN GAZETTE, Nov.
22, 1787, in ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, PUBLISHED
DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE, 1787-1788, at 218, 219 (photo. reprint
2003) (Paul Leicester Ford ed., Brooklyn, Historical Printing Club 1892)).
35
JOSEPH H. BOYETT, PH.D, GETTING THINGS DONE IN WASHINGTON:
LESSONS FOR PROGRESSIVES FROM LANDMARK LEGISLATION 31 (2011); Noah
Webster, America Essay, TEACHINGAMERICANHISTORY.ORG (Dec. 31, 1787),
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/america/.
36
JOSEPH J. ELLIS, THE QUARTET: ORCHESTRATING THE SECOND AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 1783-1789, at 203 (2015).
37
Id. at 204.
38
O. John Rogge, Unenumerated Rights, 47 CAL. L. REV. 787, 791 (1959).
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write, or to publish their sentiments; and the freedom of the press,
as one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable.”39
By September 25, 1789, the Senate had weighed in, and the two
houses had agreed on what became the First Amendment, couched
as we now know it in an indelibly negative way. “Congress shall
make no law,”40 was chosen to introduce the First Amendment, a
decision in turn that has led the Supreme Court through American
history to rule that the First Amendment barred only governmental,
not private, suppression of speech.41
What seems to be most striking today in reading those debates
about the adoption of a bill of rights is that while there was fiery
disagreement about whether to adopt such a document at all, little of
it was about what those rights were. The debates all focused on
whether it was necessary, or even useful, to have separate
amendments or to include in the Constitution itself, a list of rights,
rather than fleshing out the meaning of what those rights were.
Inevitably, the language chosen has been subject to multiple,
sometimes conflicting interpretations, and the passage of time has,
of course, led to disputes that I think Justice Scalia would have
agreed would have been inconceivable in the eighteenth century.
Who, after all, can speak with confidence today about what the
framers would have thought about net neutrality, video games, or
algorithms?
One view of the framers, however, could hardly be clearer.
“[T]he great object” of a bill of rights, Madison observed when he
first introduced it, was “to limit and qualify the powers of
government, by excepting out of the grant of power those cases in
which the government ought not to act, or to act only in a particular
mode.”42
39

James Madison, Speech in the House of Representatives (1780) (transcript
available at Creating the Bill of Rights, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/creating-the-united-states/interactives/bill-ofrights/speech/enlarge3-transcribe.html).
40
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
41
See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, 515 U.S. 557, 566 (1995)
(quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948)) (“[T]he guarantees of free
speech . . . guard only against encroachment by the government and ‘erect no
shield against merely private conduct.’”).
42
THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 25, at 54.
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Later in the debate about the adoption of the Bill of Rights,
Madison went farther. With its adoption, he said, “[t]he right of
freedom of speech is secured; the liberty of the press is expressly
declared to be beyond the reach”—the control—“of this
government.”43 The imposition of strict limits on governmental
authority over religion, speech, and press was the First Amendment’s
central purpose. It is what the First Amendment is about.
In recent years, however, we have a new debate about what the
First Amendment is about. Justice Breyer, in particular, has offered
interpretations of the First Amendment that appear to me to be closer
to those adopted in European nations in interpreting their more
limited free speech protections under the European Convention on
Human Rights.
His opinions often conclude that First Amendment interests lie
on both sides of a case—the side challenging government action and
the side supporting it—thus neutralizing the First Amendment.44
They repeatedly seek to apply the concept of proportionality,
whether, “the statute works speech-related harm that is out of
proportion to its justifications,”45 thus minimizing the First
Amendment.
In his book, Active Liberty, Justice Breyer maintained that the
primary purpose of the First Amendment goes beyond protecting the
individual from government restraints. As he wrote, the “First
Amendment seeks first and foremost to facilitate democratic selfgovernment.”46 Correctly viewed, he argued, one must “understand
the First Amendment as seeking primarily to encourage the
exchange of information and ideas necessary for citizens themselves
to shape that ‘public opinion which is the final source of government
in a democratic state.’”47
Then, in his dissenting opinion in the McCutcheon case dealing
with limitations on contributions to candidates—an opinion in
43
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47
Id. at 47.
44

FREE SPEECH UNDER FIRE: KEYNOTE REMARKS

59

which he was joined by Justices Ginsberg, Sotomayor, and Kagan—
Justice Breyer said, “the First Amendment advances not only the
individual’s right to engage in political speech, but also the public’s
interest in preserving a democratic order in which collective speech
matters.”48 The First Amendment, he argued, must be understood as
promoting a “government where laws reflect the very thoughts,
views, ideas, and sentiments, the expression of which the First
Amendment protects.”49
In my view, all these articulations offer inversions of what the
First Amendment is about. “[F]irst and foremost,”50 to use Justice
Breyer’s words, the First Amendment seeks to protect against the
dangers of governmental overreaching.51 It is not about protecting
or promoting collective speech, but avoiding the imposition of just
that sort of speech by the government.52
One of the benefits of the First Amendment is surely that it
generally leads to a better-informed public and therefore, a more
representative government. But we surely would not allow speech
to be suppressed because the government decided it led the public
to become badly informed or less enamored of representative
government. That sort of censorship is precisely the opposite of
what the First Amendment is about.
The notion that First Amendment interests are served whenever
laws genuinely reflect what the public determines it favors also
ignores the reality that the public, too often, seeks to suppress speech
of which it disapproves. Speech is sometimes ugly, outrageous, even
dangerous, and the public’s reaction and response to such speech is
often one of disgust, revulsion, even anger.
Who would doubt that the collective speech of the public would
likely result in the banning of virtual child pornography on the
Internet, lifelike depictions of children—not of real children—but
of virtual children, that as a federal statute provided, appeared to be
of minors engaged in sexual conduct. The Supreme Court ultimately
48
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held the statute was unconstitutional under the First Amendment
because it dealt with virtual pornography, not films of real
children.53
Or who would doubt that there were, and are, substantial
majorities of the public that supported, and would still support,
legislation held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, with, among
others, the vote of Justice Scalia, that banned the burning of the
American flag.54 Or that the public, inconsistently with the First
Amendment as interpreted by the Supreme Court, would
overwhelmingly support punishing, or at least silencing, members
of the Westboro Baptist Church, whose contemptible practice is to
voice their fury at the nation’s supposedly too tolerant treatment of
homosexuals by coarsely denouncing American soldiers who have
died in the defense of their country on the days of their funeral in a
place as close to the churches in which they were being mourned as
the police would allow.55
Chief Justice Roberts’ response to Breyer’s opinion in
McCutcheon seems to me cogent. He wrote:
the dissent’s “collective speech” reflected in laws is
of course the will of the majority, and plainly can
include laws that restrict free speech. The whole
point of the First Amendment is to afford individuals
protection against such infringements. The First
Amendment does not protect the government, even
when the government purports to act through
legislation reflecting “collective speech.”56
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Finally, the First Amendment was obviously not the only libertyprotecting provision of the Bill of Rights. If it were, we would not
need the other nine amendments of the Bill of Rights, or the postCivil War amendments that ended slavery, required states to provide
due process, and effectively subjected state governments to most of
the same limitations on liberty that apply to the federal government.
Unreasonable searches and seizures by federal and state
governments are banned.57 Trials in both government entities must
be fair.58 Cruel and unusual punishments in each are barred.59 What
all of these limitations have in mind is not that they are about speech,
but that they are all about limiting governmental abuse of power.
When we consider each of the topics today, ranging from hate
speech to money and speech, from surveillance, and to speech with
respect to the future, I urge you to bear in mind this history. It does
not answer every question, and to many, it may not provide any
answers at all, but it does offer a starting point, a sort of take-off
point from which we may proceed. Thank you all very much.
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